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ELECTION EVIDENCE: THE PROMISES AND REALITIES
OF CALIFORNIA’S CITIZENS COMMISSION
Brett Piersma*
[W]henever the people shall choose their representatives upon just
and undeniably equal measures, . . . it cannot be doubted to be the will
and act of the society . . . .
—John Locke1
The character of our democracy is at stake in how we elect our representatives as much as in which representatives we elect and what laws
they enact.
—Dennis Thompson2
INTRODUCTION
That California political and electoral pathologies are some of the worst in the
nation has become axiomatic. The state is known for its crisis in governance,3 a notoriously tardy budget,4 and bizarre congressional districts.5 This reputation, indeed much
of California history, is a double-edged sword. Along with these pathologies and
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2014; M.Ed., University of California,
Santa Barbara, 2001; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2000. I would like to
thank Lee Tankle for his sufferance throughout this process, Rebecca Green for her comments
on an early draft, and the editorial staff for their improvements to the final product. All mistakes, of course, are my own. I would also like to thank Janel, Ella, and Lucie for making it
all worthwhile.
1
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 175 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
2
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES, at vii (2002).
3
Raphael J. Sonenshein, Can a Citizens’ Commission Help Repair California Government?
Lessons from Local Charter Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 637, 657–58 (2011) (describing the
belief that California has major structural problems as “widespread”).
4
See Karl Manheim et al., Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions and Government
Reform: Symposium Introduction, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 393, 400–01 (2011) (assigning blame
for California’s dysfunction in part to citizens’ overuse of the initiative, referendum, and recall
processes); Joe Mathews, Op-Ed., The California Fix: Making Amends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2009, at A17 (quoting California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald George: “Frequent amendments—coupled with the implicit threat of more in the future—have rendered our state government dysfunctional.”); The Ungovernable State, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 33 (describing
California’s budget dysfunction and attributing it to a “combination of features” of the state’s
political and structural dynamics).
5
Patrick McGreevy, Redistricting Panel Will Draw a Line, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, at
AA1 (describing the 23rd district as the “ribbon of shame” because it narrows to a small strip of
land that stretches 200 miles along the California coast “disappear[ing] at high tide”).
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systemic breakdowns come success stories in reform.6 In a nation of states as incubators
for policy experimentation, California is a teeming Petri dish.7 The state has developed
a reputation for setting national trends in social8 and political reform, often decades before other states.9 For example, California is one of only twenty-two states to adopt the
initiative,10 referendum,11 or both during the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century.12 Of these states, California is one of only ten to adopt the initiative for both statutes and state constitutional amendments.13 While more than a third of the states have
provisions allowing citizens to recall elected officials,14 the procedure had only been
used once in the United States to recall a governor before the recall of California
Governor Gray Davis in 2003.15 Yet California is not just experimental and progressive.
Steeped in populism, its measures consistently undermine the political power of elected
representatives by turning power back to voters “making public policy at the ballot
box.”16 It is no surprise then that California’s most recent effort to reform the process
of redistricting is also among the most progressive and antipolitician in the nation: the
adoption of an independent citizens redistricting commission.17
6

See STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING, PART I 141 (Lynda McNeil ed., 1982) (describing California’s progressive political and electoral history, particularly its roots back to Upton
Sinclair and the impact of immigration).
7
Justice Louis Brandeis’s dictum in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann is perhaps
the best-known expression of this concept: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
While it has since become common wisdom among political scientists, its constitutional home
is the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers not delegated to the United States to the states
or to the people. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
8
See, e.g., JONATHAN BELL, CALIFORNIA CRUCIBLE: THE FORGING OF MODERN AMERICAN
LIBERALISM 3 (2012) (“California had by the 1970s become a trailblazer for national debates
over taxation, sexual and gender rights, racial discrimination, and the welfare state . . . .”).
9
See STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING, supra note 6, at 141.
10
Initiative is “a petition process that allows voters to place one or more propositions on the
referendum ballot” and has roots in “the Athenian ecclesia of the fifth century B.C.” JOSEPH F.
ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING 1 (1999).
11
Referendum is “the submission of laws, whether in the form of statute or constitution, to
the voting citizens for their ratification or rejection,” and has been employed in the United States
in some form since the Revolution. ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN
AMERICA 2 (Guant, Inc. 1997) (1893).
12
Initiative & Referendum Inst., Univ. Of S. Cal., State I&R, http://www.iandrinstitute.org
/statewide_i%26r.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
13
Id.
14
MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY:
CALIFORNIA’S RECALL AND BEYOND 11 (2008).
15
Id. at 4–5, 11 (describing the removal of North Dakota Governor Lynn Frazier in 1921).
Recall has been used throughout the states to recall other state and local officials. See id. at 11.
16
Id. at vii.
17
Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808,
1812 (2012) (describing both Arizona and California’s redistricting commissions as “the boldest
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The independent commission ostensibly depoliticizes the process of drawing state
senate, assembly, and congressional district lines by removing politicians almost entirely from the process. While controversial, these commissions address the inherent
conflict of interest of partisan gerrymandering. Yet advocates have also touted the citizens commission’s potential to increase district competitiveness, reduce partisanship in
government, and create more centrist legislatures.18 If true, commissions may untie the
Gordian Knot of dysfunctional government and reduce much of the gridlock plaguing
California government.19
This Note’s main finding is that these possibilities are overstated, especially in view
of the results of the 2012 election in California. Even if greater competitiveness is desirable and offers these potential outcomes, the constraints on legislative redistricting also
constrain citizens commissions. These constraints stem from federal statutes, court decisions, and state guiding principles. As a result, redistricting commissions cannot create
as many truly competitive districts as hoped and offer little of the promises made by
their proponents. On the other hand, the California citizens commission did achieve its
most obvious and primary goal: to remove self-interested legislators from the process
and make it “open so it cannot be controlled by the party in power.”20
This Note concludes that the primary impact of the citizens commission’s work in
California has been to increase the appearance that the system is less beholden to politicians and to weaken the power of legislators to use redistricting in political horse trading. The new maps also forced several legislators to retire rather than face opponents
they could not defeat or more popular fellow party members.21
This Note proceeds in four parts: Part I outlines the constraints that Congress, the
Supreme Court, and state legislatures place on redistricting. Part II discusses the democratic impetus for redistricting reform and evaluates the merits of citizens commissions against other redistricting mechanisms. It also briefly outlines the history of
redistricting in California. Part III discusses the passage of Propositions 11 and 20 and
assesses the legal challenges to both. Part IV embarks on case studies of three
California districts and examines the impact of the commission’s work on the 2012
congressional elections.
departures from the traditional legislative redistricting model”). Part II describes other, less progressive options available to reformers such as advisory commissions or commissions which
ratify district lines drawn by legislatures.
18
See infra Part II.
19
The text of California Proposition 11 did not purport to increase competitiveness. It did,
however, identify the “serious conflict of interest” involved in having legislators draw their own
districts and explained that this is “why 99 percent of incumbent politicians were reelected.” Text
of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11 § 2(a) 137, available at http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov
/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf. Instead, increased competitiveness and decreased polarization
were held out by major proponents as benefits of the proposition. See infra Part III.
20
Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11 § 2(c) 137, available at http://www.wedrawthe
lines.ca.gov/downloads/voters_first_act.pdf.
21
See infra Part IV.
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I. CONSTRAINTS AND COMPETITIVENESS
A democracy may be measured by the vibrancy of its elections.22 Only when candidates actively compete for their seats in contested elections can voters hold politicians
accountable for their decisions.23 Indeed, the “competitive struggle for the people’s
vote” is a necessary condition to the democratic process.24 For an election to be vibrant
and competitive, the votes cast must have real meaning and must not count as a mere
rubber stamp on decisions made beyond their reach.25 Yet Congress has become the
least competitive of all representative institutions in recent years, largely due to the redistricting process practiced in most states.26 As the process is currently conducted in
most states, redistricting presents at least two concerns central to the democratic process
and to this Note’s thesis.
First is the concern about who will control the redistricting process. When representatives redraw their own district lines, they have a clear “personal interest distinct
from that of their Constituents,” as James Madison warned at the Constitutional
Convention.27 The American system of state-designed redistricting is particularly vulnerable to this problem of self interest as legislators control the process by which their
constituents are carved out.28 This often results in “gerrymanders”—oddly shaped districts legislators draw to “pack,” “stack,” or “crack” voters in pursuit of legislators’ electoral goals.29 Incumbents of opposite parties often collude in bipartisan gerrymanders
22

JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES AND
LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 2 (2008).
23
THOMAS E. MANN & BRUCE E. CAIN, PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 1 (2005).
24
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1950) (“[T]he
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people’s vote.”).
25
WINBURN, supra note 22, at 3 (stating that voters vote not only so their candidate will win,
but so that their vote will “count,” suggesting an almost ethereal aspect to the process).
26
MANN & CAIN, supra note 23, at 1.
27
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 249–50 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1937).
28
WINBURN, supra note 22, at 3.
29
See, e.g., Anthony E. Chavez, The Red and Blue Golden State: Why California’s
Proposition 11 Will Not Produce More Competitive Elections, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 311, 314
(2011) (“[S]tacking refers to combining concentrations of a minority population with larger concentrations of a white population to ensure that the districts contain white voting majorities.”);
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1379, 1416 (2012) (discussing the “pack” and “stack” concepts in the context of limiting minority groups’ representation by cramming them into one single district or dividing them so thinly
so as to deny representation altogether). For a visual example of how this technique functions,
see Mike Sayer, Southern Coalition for Social Justice: Training on Political Redistricting,
(July 26–31, 2010), http://latinojustice.org/redistricting/ny/Voting_Dilution_Techniques_Mike
_Sayer.pdf.
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to secure reelection of each party’s incumbents, resulting in non-competitive maps.30
Thus, while incumbents are interested in securing reelection with as little competition
as possible, their constituents desire the exact opposite: vibrant elections in which candidates propose distinct and substantive solutions to complex problems in a competitive
fight where voters suss out the best ideas and select their candidates accordingly. When
representatives control redistricting and have the chance to “select voters” rather than
vice versa, something fundamental to democracy is sacrificed.31
A second concern is that the process of redistricting will result in unequal representation, whereby “one person’s vote counts only a fraction . . . of another’s” vote.32
While the Constitution does not mandate a particular redistricting process or even that
representatives be selected by districts rather than at large,33 Congress, the Supreme
Court, and state legislatures have imposed many constraints on the process.34 Many of
these constraints are related to racial gerrymandering and voter dilution.35
If redistricting as legislatures currently practice it results in noncompetitive districts,
which themselves result in a host of governance-related pathologies, redistricting reform
may be the most promising path toward improving how government functions.36 The
U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on gerrymandering, paying particular attention to
race and majority-minority districts,37 while addressing the issue of the political gerrymander differently.38 All of these rules represent constraints that bind legislatures and
will also bind any group tasked with redrawing district lines.
A. Gerrymandering and Constraints on Redistricting
The Court has been more lucid in setting forth a standard with regard to race than
to political line drawing. The Court has held that efforts to separate districts solely on
30

Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform since Baker
v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
6, 23 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
31
SCHUMPETER, supra note 24; see infra Part I.B.
32
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 120 (1980).
33
See THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 51 (2008) (explaining that the Constitution does not mandate
the use of single-member districts and “many states did elect representatives from at-large, multimember districts for many years”). This changed with the Apportionment Act of 1842. Id.
34
See infra Part I.A.
35
See infra Part I.A.
36
Cain et al., supra note 30, at 17 (explaining why redistricting reform at the state level has
emerged as a way to increase competitive elections).
37
The history of voting rights legislation and jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note
except insofar as they mandate redistricting processes as discussed below.
38
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 29, at 1382–84 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on political gerrymandering as leaving unresolved whether “a standard for identifying
unlawful gerrymanders might exist”).
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the basis of race can be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.39 The Court has
struck down racial gerrymanders in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, citing race as
the legislatures’ improper “predominant purpose.”40 In effect the Court has said that
states may use race as a factor, but it may not be the factor.41 Further, under the Voting
Rights Act’s (VRA) “preclearance” provision, specified states and counties must get
federal approval prior to changing their voting practices.42 The Court thus views race
as a suspect classification. As a result, states will face strict scrutiny when they draw
majority-minority districts using race, requiring the state to show the plan is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.43
This creates an uneasy tension. Under the VRA, the Justice Department may mandate states to draw majority-minority districts, but those districts could be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause.44 Further, because states will necessarily rely on race
in order to draw such districts, it will be easier for challengers to prove that the states
utilized race as the dominant factor.45 State legislators and redistricting commissions
must trace a careful path when redistricting voters from one district to another.
Those redrawing district lines are also not permitted to “weight the vote of one
county or one district more heavily than . . . another.”46 The Court has applied this “one
person, one vote” standard to elections to both the U.S. House of Representatives and
state legislatures.47 These reapportionment cases have had a dramatic effect on the
39

See Mark E. Rush, Representation in Theory and Practice, in VOTING RIGHTS AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 7 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
40
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Race and Representation in the Supreme Court, in VOTING RIGHTS
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 49, 69–74 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998) (summarizing
the racial gerrymandering cases as “mov[ing] sharply away from the Court’s tradition . . . of respecting the fundamentally political nature of redistricting”).
41
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
42
Preclearance is mandated in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Pamela S. Karlan, The
Impact of the Voting Rights Act on African Americans: Second- and Third-Generation Issues,
in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (Mark E. Rush, ed. 1998).
43
CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, REDISTRICTING: THE MOST POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN AMERICA
66 (2010).
44
Rush, supra note 39, at 7.
45
BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 66.
46
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244 (1962). Until Baker, the Court held questions of distribution of citizens to be a political question—a constitutional issue that courts should abstain from
resolving because they are better left to the other departments of government. The Court announced the “one person, one vote” standard in Gray v. Sanders. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). See
Jesse H. Choper, Introduction to THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007); Richard L.
Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfulfilled, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah &
Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 1962 Baker v. Carr decision was
“the beginning of the end of the political question doctrine”).
47
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (ruling unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause legislative plans for the apportionment of seats in the Alabama legislature);
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process of redistricting, yet have also caused significant controversy. A case can be
made that the voter dilution cases themselves led to the race-conscious districting plans
the Court was preoccupied with under the VRA in the 1990s.48 The reapportionment
cases laid the foundation for the transformation of the right to vote, an individual right,
into the right to effective representation, an “interest-based or group right.”49 This has
introduced a conflict into equal protection law between individual and group rights.
Justice Clarence Thomas lamented this irreconcilable conflict in Holder v. Hall,50
“reject[ing] the assumption . . . [that] the Voting Rights Act can be construed to cover
potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms.”51 Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress
has provided clear guidance on how states might implement the VRA’s mandate to
remedy situations of vote dilution and abide by the ruling that race is a suspect classification, subject to strict scrutiny.52 A citizens commission entering the redistricting
farrago may find it nearly impossible to satisfy every rule, regulation, and restriction
while making any significant improvement to competitiveness.
B. Political Gerrymandering
Despite Madison’s fear of politicians controlling the process, partisan gerrymandering—drawing district lines to protect incumbents or target opponents—has received the Court’s imprimatur and is not unconstitutional.53 In Bush v. Vera,54 Justice
O’Connor explained: “[W]e have recognized incumbency protection, at least in the
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (ruling that apportionment of congressional district seats
in Georgia so that one congressman represented two to three times as many as another violated
the Constitution).
48
Anthony A. Peacock, Equal Representation or Guardian Democracy? The Supreme
Court’s Foray into the Politics of Reapportionment and Its Legacy, in VOTING RIGHTS AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 23, 43 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
49
Id.
50
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
51
Id. at 945.
52
Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, Voting Rights Mismatch: The Challenge of Applying
the Voting Rights Act to “Other Minorities,” in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE
UNITED STATES 141, 142 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
53
Unless, of course, unlawfully based on race. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(finding that a North Carolina redistricting map raised a sufficient question of racial gerrymandering to suggest an equal protection violation); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (ruling that three Texas districts were unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered). But see
James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott’s Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of
Slavery, S. CHANGES, Fall 1998, at 28, reprinted in 3 RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE
CONSTITUTION 336 (Marsha J. Tyson Darling ed., 2001) (characterizing Shaw and its progeny
as promoting an unworkable color-blind paradigm); Jamin B. Raskin, Supreme Court’s Double
Standard, THE NATION, Feb. 6, 1995, at 167–68 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s rulings as a
double standard meant to protect “white incumbents” in the U.S. House of Representatives but
not African-American or Latino majorities).
54
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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limited form of ‘avoiding contests between incumbent[s],’ as a legitimate state goal.”55
In Davis v. Bandemer,56 the Court seemed to narrow this by recognizing a cause of
action for political gerrymandering, but found the Indiana map in question did not
surmount the “threshold requirement” for showing “discriminatory vote dilution.”57
The standard the plurality announced—that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs
only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade
a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”—
proved unworkable.58
The Court did no better in Vieth v. Jubelirer,59 where it refused to overturn a
Pennsylvania plan challenged by Democratic voters.60 Facing the opportunity to give
teeth to the Bandemer standard, the Court instead summarily ruled the issue of partisan
gerrymandering “non-justiciable” because “no judicially discernible and manageable
standards for adjudicating such claims exist.”61 A set of four justices stated that plaintiffs had proved sufficient evidence to win, but relied on different standards to come to
their conclusion.62 Plaintiffs in every case since Bandemer have faced similar outcomes
as the Court has refused to find sufficient disadvantage to warrant overturning a state’s
partisan redistricting.63
While the Court has severely circumscribed the potential for future political gerrymanders to be ruled unconstitutional, California has enunciated a clear rule on political
gerrymanders: “Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.”64 So reads the
California Constitution since voters approved Proposition 11 in 2008, exemplifying
the “laboratories of democracy” vision of American federalism.65 More importantly,
this simple clause frees up the citizens commission to pursue other goals such as competitiveness rather than incumbency protection.66
The Supreme Court has required that the districts be adjusted every ten years after
the census and that such districts be as nearly equal as possible.67 Apart from concerns
55

Id. at 964.
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
57
Id. at 110.
58
Id.; see Stephanopoulos, supra note 29, at 1381–82 (arguing that in the area of political
gerrymandering, “the case law is in chaos . . . [and] [t]here is thus an urgent doctrinal and academic need for new ideas”).
59
541 U.S. 267 (2003).
60
Id. at 267.
61
Id.
62
BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 130.
63
Id.
64
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
65
California Online Voting Guide: Proposition 11, CAL. VOTER FOUND., http://www
.calvoter.org/voter/elections/2008/general/props/prop11.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2008).
66
See infra Part I.C.
67
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (“The conception of political equality . . . can
mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
56
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about racial gerrymandering and the weight of each vote, the Court has left the matter
to the states. As a result, most states allow legislatures to either directly draw electoral
maps or play an integral role in the process.68 This very discretion at the state level has
made possible a variety of proposals to change the process, each bearing the marks of
the state’s unique history, culture, and experience with corruption.
C. Principles and Competitiveness
Any group tasked with redrawing district lines, be it the legislature or an independent commission, will be constrained not only by federal law and court-imposed
restrictions, which themselves vary by location, but also by traditional redistricting principles.69 For example, in California, only four counties are subject to the Section 5 preclearance procedures of the Federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) while all of Alabama,
Mississippi, and Virginia are.70 All states, however, must abide by Section 2 of the Act
which prohibits any practice that denies or abridges anyone’s right to vote based on
race, color, or minority language status.71 But many states have gone beyond federal
law by writing into their constitutions several “principles” to guide redistricting.72
Geographic contiguity, where all parts of a district are connected to each other,
is “one of the most common rules for drawing district lines”73 and is specifically enumerated in the California Constitution.74 Compactness, when a district has a “regular
shape, with constituents all living relatively near to each other” is also a “traditional”
principle75 and, according to the California Constitution, should be followed “[t]o the
extent practicable.”76 The geographical integrity of political subdivisions such as cities,
counties, and communities of interest must also be “respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible.”77
Noticeably absent from this list is “competitiveness,” which is not specifically enumerated in the California Constitution and has not been identified as a “traditional
(1963))). The California Constitution also requires districts in that state to be reasonably equal
in population. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
68
Corbett A. Grainger, Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in California?,
53 J.L. & ECON. 545, 545–46 (2010).
69
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly required them to, many states apply the following redistricting principles: compactness, geographic contiguity, retaining political subdivisions, and maintaining communities of interest. See Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010
Census, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 244–45 (2009).
70
See infra Part III.A.
71
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
72
JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 50 (2010).
73
Id.
74
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
75
LEVITT, supra note 72, at 51.
76
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
77
Id.
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race-neutral districting principle[ ]” by the Supreme Court.78 But increased competitiveness has been cited as a benefit concomitant with the creation of citizens redistricting
commissions.79 Should citizens commissions intentionally attempt to draw more competitive districts? If so, to what extent can they succeed when they are otherwise constrained by so many other rules, regulations, and principles?
II. THE IMPULSE TO REFORM REDISTRICTING
Before evaluating Propositions 11 and 20 in California, the work of its redistricting
commission, or the outcome of the 2012 election, it is important to discuss the constitutional and democratic implications of such efforts. This Part discusses legislative redistricting and asks why citizens redistricting commissions emerge and whether they offer
substantial hope to ameliorate the ills of traditional redistricting processes.
A. Redistricting by Legislature
Under the U.S. Constitution, the method of drawing electoral maps is left to the
discretion of the states.80 Yet from the nation’s inception, the dangers of allowing politicians to choose their own voters has been apparent.81 Elbridge Gerry’s original
“Gerry-mander” snaked through Massachusetts and ensured the election of a fellow
Republican.82 Since then, the term has been a synonym for opportunism of the party in
power.83 Evidence shows a long history of political manipulation of district lines at the
state level. Nearly every decadal redistricting from 1789 to 1913 contained at least
one district where contiguity was questionable.84 Recent evidence suggests that even
78

See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 901 (1995) (including such principles as “compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, [and] racial considerations”).
79
See infra Part II.C.
80
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections . . . shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.”); Tim Storey, An Overview of Redistricting,
in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 1, 1–2 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
81
See Peter F. Galderisi & Bruce Cain, Introduction: Redistricting Past, Present, and Future,
in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (explaining that the
practice of gerrymandering actually preceded Governor Elbridge Gerry’s famous 1812 plan “as
the shifting of district boundaries for political advantage occurred with some regularity in states
and in the British colonies”).
82
BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 107.
83
See Storey, supra note 80, at 2.
84
Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI.
HIST. 159, 179 (1998). A “contiguous district” is “one in which it is possible to travel from any
point in the district to any other point in the district without crossing the district boundary . . . .”
Justin Levitt, Redistricting in the West: The Legal Context, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 15, 24 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011). Today, many states require
legislative districts to be contiguous. Id.
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after the reforms of the 1960s, modern districts are more often discontiguous than they
historically were.85
Until the twentieth century, the basic unit of representation at the state level was the
town or county,86 and the evidence shows state legislatures did not often divide counties
or towns in their redistricting.87 However, as the population grew into the early twentieth century, the apportioning of seats did not keep pace with population shifts, both
intentionally and by neglect.88 Just prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark population
and redistricting rulings in the 1960s, one Southern California district had 422 times as
many people as the smallest district, and Tennessee had failed to reapportion representatives for sixty years.89
Legislative redistricting therefore presents a host of dangers. As previously discussed, conflicts of interest are inherent in the process. Representatives may protect
their own and their party’s electoral prospects while seeking to dilute the votes of the
minority party.90 Without external pressure, either from citizens groups, federal law, or
state law, legislators write electoral rules with substantial discretion, inclined to protect
partisan gains and scuttle electoral reform proposals.91 With the power to change the
process of redrawing district lines vested in the very body that benefits from the status
quo, it is not surprising that this system persists. While some states have adopted
some form of citizens commission, most states continue to allow redistricting by the
state legislature.92
B. Redistricting Reform as Remonstration
Redistricting reform has become the siren song to the politically dispossessed, offering perhaps the last best hope to restore democratic representation and responsive
government to statehouses.93 The hope attached to redistricting reform in California parallels the enthusiasm that surrounded the passage of the initiative and referendum in
1911 when Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson touted the promises of extending the
initiative to the people as “perhaps the greatest service that could be rendered our
85

Altman, supra note 84, at 180.
Levitt, supra note 84, at 15.
87
Altman, supra note 84, at 180.
88
Levitt, supra note 84, at 15–16.
89
Id. at 16.
90
Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Redistricting, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 111 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
91
Id. at 112.
92
Levitt, supra note 84, at 17.
93
For a brief summary explaining why the former redistricting process resulted in more ideological representatives in the California legislature, an increase in registered-independent voters,
and greater polarization, see George Skelton, A Polarized, Paralyzed State, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2009, at A2.
86
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State,” bringing an end to “exaction and extortion from the people.”94 The irony that
many of the pathologies facing California today may be unintended consequences
of the initiative system itself cannot be lost on present day reformers.95 The greater
irony is using the initiative process to fix a state arguably made ungovernable by that
very process.96
When voters in states with the initiative process become convinced the political
system is broken beyond what legislators can manage to repair, they often turn to
changing the way legislators are selected.97 Research has shown that states with the initiative are far more likely to adopt reforms weakening party control over redistricting.98
For example, in 1974 Colorado voters, frustrated with legislators’ proposed district map
and the impact it would have on communities bifurcating them indiscriminately, passed
an initiative delegating district drawing to a commission.99 A similar campaign in
Oklahoma, which then-Governor Edmondson supported out of frustration with the
“rurally dominated legislature,” failed in 1960 after opposition developed within the
governor’s own party.100 The path to a commission in Arizona was fraught with legal
94
Hiram Johnson, Governor, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911), available at http://governors
.library.ca.gov/addresses/23-hjohnson01.html.
95
See Skelton, supra note 93 (identifying two “voter-injected poisons—term limits and the
two-thirds vote requirement” as a cause of legislative gridlock); Editorial, Prop. 25 Changes
Everything, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A24 (questioning the wisdom of California voters who
simultaneously passed Proposition 25, which removed the two-thirds vote requirement for adopting a budget, and Proposition 26, which created a two-thirds vote requirement for raising fees).
96
For more recent examples of how the initiative process has affected how Sacramento
operates, see George Skelton, Californians Split Their Vote, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A2
(characterizing the results of the 2010 election as “plac[ing] more shackles on the governor
and Legislature” and quoting governor-elect Jerry Brown as saying, “[t]he taxpayers gave and
they also took away”). Skelton also decries Californians’ rejection of Proposition 21 (which
would have “saved the state’s deteriorating parks”), passage of Proposition 22 (a “shackle on
Sacramento . . . [that] will cost the state billions by eliminating its ability to tap local transportation and redevelopment funds”), and rejection of Proposition 24 (voters “defended big
business” by rejecting the repeal of corporate tax breaks). Id.
97
See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 345 (2007) (comparing factors contributing to redistricting initiatives such as “[a] recent egregious gerrymander or
a nationwide tide in favor of electoral reform . . .” with instances in which voters are “relatively
satisfied with the political status quo, [such that] they may be reluctant to try to fix what does not
seem to be broken.”); see also Cain, supra note 17, at 1813 (describing the “evolutionary pattern”
of the creation of these commissions in reaction to elected officials’ actions).
98
Donovan, supra note 90, at 130.
99
Stephanopoulos, supra note 94, at 355–56. Today, the Colorado General Assembly draws
district lines for congressional seats while the Reapportionment Commission draws State Senate
and State House of Representative district lines. See Redistricting in Colorado, COLORADO:
THE OFFICIAL STATE WEB PORTAL, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CGA-ReDistrict
/CBON/1251581558103#How_is_Redistricting_accomplished_in_Colorado_ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2013).
100
Stephanopoulos, supra note 94, at 348. A slightly modified version passed just two years
later, although notably after the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr.
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hurdles for nearly thirty years.101 Voters finally passed Proposition 106 in 2000 granting
authority to redistrict to a five-person commission drawn from a pool of citizens reviewed by the state’s Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.102 This is just a
sampling of the push factors that result in citizens redistricting commissions.
There are many ways a state might approach redistricting, utilizing any combination of citizens, state bureaucrats, legislators, and judges. Bruce Cain, Professor of
Political Science at Stanford University, has evaluated these different combinations
using two key factors: independence and autonomy.103 Using these two as yardsticks
to measure the composition and the power of redistricting commissions will provide us
with a view of just where true authority over the redistricting process lies.104
First, independence means freedom from control by legislators.105 By measuring
the independence of those individuals drawing the lines, we can evaluate the degree to
which a commission has an implicit conflict of interest.106 Independence can be viewed
as lying on a spectrum between complete dependence and complete independence.107
Many systems, described more fully below, allow legislators themselves to draw the
lines and are arguably the least independent.108 Other systems allow legislators to be involved in the selection of commission members, creating either a moderate degree of
independence in the case of designees or no independence when composed of elected

101

The state’s district plans were overturned by a district court in 1971, rejected by a federal
court in 1981, and rejected by the Justice Department for failing to produce enough “majority
minority” districts in the early 1990s. Cain, supra note 17, at 1831. In 2009, the Arizona
Supreme Court ruled on the commission’s 2002 plan, finding that Proposition 106 requires the
commission to create “more competitive districts to the extent practicable when doing so does
not cause significant detriment to the other goals.” Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 687 (Ariz. 2009).
102
Cain, supra note 17, at 1831–32.
103
Id. at 1818–19. Jonathan Winburn discusses largely the same two factors, which he labels,
respectively, “membership” and “capacity.” Jonathan Winburn, Does it Matter if Legislatures
or Commissions Draw the Lines?, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 137,
141 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
104
See Cain, supra note 17, at 1812 (summarizing independent redistricting commissions’
performance and offering observations regarding their independence and autonomy).
105
Id. at 1814. Cain instantiates “independence” by describing a commission of members who
cannot hold political office. Id. at 1818.
106
Id. at 1812; see also BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 133 (describing the Iowa approach as
highly revered because of the “limited influence of party politics” even though the plan does not
come from a commission).
107
Cain utilizes a “continuum” of independence and places New York’s “advisory commission” only slightly apart from pure legislative districting because both elected officials
and nonlegislators serve on it. Cain, supra note 17, at 1814.
108
THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 133 (discussing Madison’s warning about “the dangers of
letting representatives decide their own privileges”). Thompson argues that we should be
“concerned that [legislators] favor rules that protect incumbents and discourage challengers.” Id.
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officials.109 Finally, in some systems there is little or no nexus between the commissioners and the legislators whose districts they are mapping.110
Second, autonomy means the ability to enact and place into effect the product of
the commission’s work.111 In some systems, a commission may be fully independent,
yet its work is merely advisory.112 This is the case in three states where the commission
serves only to advise either the legislature or the governor.113 Other systems are structured such that the commission’s work only takes effect if the legislature fails to adopt
a new map.114
This framework suggests several questions about redistricting. First, is it even possible within the American system to design any redistricting procedure, be it utilizing
elected, appointed, or randomly drawn individuals, that would be genuinely free from
self-interest? Is it inevitable that politics and partisanship will seep into the process?
Second, is placing the redistricting process in the hands of unelected citizens more or
less democratic than allowing elected representatives to do so? After all, removing
incumbents who have been duly elected by “jiggling the lines is, in a sense, undemocratic.”115 Third, under what circumstances might a commission, operating dispassionately and following specified rules of neutrality, nonetheless run afoul of equal
protection guarantees or create political gerrymanders? Finally, applying this framework and these inquiries, how did California fare in its first foray into citizens drawing
district lines in the 2012 election?
C. Citizens Commissions
Of the arguments in favor of removing from state legislatures the task of redistricting and delegating it to a citizens commission, one has become particularly salient: to
reduce the “safety” of electoral districts116 thereby increasing competitiveness. Safe districts, it is thought, result in less engaged, more partisan politicians and more polarization in legislatures.117 The argument may be broken down as follows.
109

Cain, supra note 17, at 1816.
Id. at 1817.
111
Id. at 1814 (describing “autonomous power” as the ability to “enact a redistricting plan
without legislative approval”).
112
WINBURN, supra note 22, at 141.
113
Id. at 141–42. Maine, Maryland, and Vermont utilize this system. Several other states have
implemented temporary advisory commissions. Id.
114
Id. at 141.
115
BRUNELL, supra note 33, at 69.
116
A “safe district” is defined as one in which an elected representative is all but certain
to win reelection, thus requiring little or no campaigning on the part of the representative. Some
political scientists consider a district safe when the candidate wins greater than fifty-five percent
of the vote. JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 327 (Charles
Hartford et al. eds., 10th ed. 2006).
117
Chavez, supra note 29, at 338 (outlining supporters’ arguments for competitive districts
including the proposition that they lead to greater responsiveness among legislators).
110
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First, citizens commissions operate under neutral or bipartisan impulses, considering population change and other nonpolitical principles, as opposed to partisan factors
such as incumbent protection.118 This is so because these commissions are specifically
designed to be independent with rigorous and thorough vetting processes to ensure the
members are not beholden to politicians.119 While there is reason to question this premise, this doubt may in fact reflect distrust in the design of the commission rather than
lack of faith in the commissioners.120
A second premise is that a commission operating under such neutral impulses will
create more competitive districts.121 This is thought to result naturally rather than by the
design of commissioners as they focus on nonpolitical goals.122 In fact, Proposition 11
does not require the commission to use competitiveness as a factor.123 This outcome,
increased competitiveness, is thought to result indirectly and naturally when citizens
commissions adhere to neutral criteria such as compactness, geographic and political
boundaries, and respect for communities.124
Finally, competitive districts force candidates to move closer to the political center
and to respond more attentively to constituents by attenuating their positions.125
118

See WINBURN, supra note 22, at 17 (explaining that district lines should be drawn based
on “factors that either apply to both parties (or incumbents) equally or, most likely, do not even
consider partisanship (or incumbent standing)”).
119
Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513,
533–36 (2011). Levitt describes the reason for these commissioners’ independence: “[C]itizens
whose job security is not affected by the outcome of a redistricting process will feel far less compulsion to distort otherwise coherent districts . . . .” Id. at 538.
120
Id. at 540–41 (describing people’s tendencies to “default[ ] on difficult political judgments,
prioritizing certain criteria for the wrong reasons”).
121
Jean Merl & Michael J. Mishak, Panel’s Final Redistricting Maps Drawn, L.A. TIMES,
July 30, 2011, at A1. Other changes to the redistricting process may also result in more competitive districts. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 29, at 369–70 (proposing a hybrid approach in which
“[t]he commission could review the plan developed by the Legislature and propose changes”).
122
This theory has been debated for decades among political scientists. Recently, in view of
California’s experiment with redistricting, it has gained more attention. See generally Chavez,
supra note 29. For a list of criteria for district boundaries the commission must follow, in order
of priority, see Redistricting Reform in California: Proposition 11 on the November 2008
California Ballot, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES 21 [hereinafter Redistricting Reform
in California], available at http://policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/95928.pdf.
123
Redistricting Reform in California, supra note 122, at 27 (summarizing two possible reasons why the authors left competitiveness out: the Arizona experience where competitive districts
were challenged in the courts for seven years and the difficulty of creating competitive districts
in California due to population concentration and compactness requirements).
124
See Cain, supra note 17, at 1823 (explaining that creating more competitive districts was
an implicit motive of redistricting reform in California despite ballot measures lacking competition as explicitly enumerated criteria).
125
BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 113. The concomitant inference is that responsiveness to constituents is an element of good democracy. But see BRUNELL, supra note 33, at 75–89 (2008)
(arguing that noncompetitive districts and districts with little ideological diversity, maximize the
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Politicians in competitive districts face a more centrist median voter, necessitating more
frequent interactions with voters to gauge public opinion.126 It would not be so easy to
assume the views of a politician’s constituency’s position.127 Furthermore, under the
California law, this moderating effect would be felt in Sacramento as well as in
Washington, D.C. because the process applies to both state district lines as well as
congressional ones.128
An incumbent who has typically won reelection in his district for several elections
who then faces a new, more evenly divided constituency due to redistricting, faces a
difficult set of options: retire, acknowledging that victory in this new district is more
than an uphill battle; hold to his political values and be prepared to lose with his head
held high; or adjust his positions toward the middle voters in the new district.129 Alternatively, he could elect to run in a nearby district with more like-minded voters and
face a difficult primary battle against a fellow partisan.130
Competitive districts are also thought to increase electoral participation131 and reduce party polarization in the legislature.132 The conclusion aptly drawn from these
premises is that any state interested in structural reforms to encourage moderate political
platforms and politicians who are more responsive to the electorate should consider implementing the citizens commission model. If this is true, citizens commissions may
hold great potential to ameliorate gridlock in state capitals and in Congress.
While these goals may be desirable, independent citizens commissions do not come
easily or emerge overnight. They are the result of a long process of development subject
to historical forces and the political culture of a population.133 Some states confront
number of winning voters, improve voters’ attitudes toward Congress, and enhance representation by increasing the number of constituents accurately represented by their congressman).
126
As with many of the arguments surrounding citizens commissions, there is some debate
as to whether politicians in competitive districts court the median voter more effectively. See,
e.g., Chavez, supra note 29, at 338–39.
127
Id. at 341–42 (summarizing two key criticisms of this point: “[B]y definition, competitive
districts leave more voters unrepresented,” and “[c]andidates would likely be less interested in
running for office if they knew that slight changes in political sentiment would remove them
from office.”).
128
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
129
BULLOCK, supra note 43, at 100–02.
130
See, e.g., BRUNELL, supra note 33, at 69 (describing Republican redistricting in Pennsylvania that resulted in a 2002 primary battle between two popular Democrats, John Murtha and
Frank Mascara, a fight that became “at times quite nasty”).
131
Chavez, supra note 29, at 338.
132
Grainger, supra note 68, at 547 (finding a relationship between legislative redistricting and
polarization). But see NOLAN MCCARTY et al., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES 1 (2006) (finding polarization is not attributable to redistricting but is
instead the result of income inequality).
133
The adoption of a somewhat unusual redistricting process in Iowa, for example, reflects
decades of wrangling between the U.S. Supreme Court, state supreme court, legislators, and citizens. See Peverill Squire, Iowa and the Political Consequences of Playing Redistricting Straight,
in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENIUM 261–63 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005).
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abuses of redistricting authority with great leaps forward, while others experiment in
smaller steps.134 For example, citizens commissions may start as advisory in nature
only, whereby an independent or quasi-independent commission drafts a redistricting
plan subject to approval by the legislature.135 This form of commission exists in various
iterations in several states such as Iowa and New York.136 Other states have experimented with a “backup commission” approach such that stalemated negotiations in the
legislature throw the issue to the commission.137 This system incentivizes bargaining
strategies and other benefits.138 Another option for reform involves “politician commissions” composed of elected officials who do not have to obtain legislative approval for
their work.139 The benefit of this system is that it recognizes the political nature of the
task and encourages bargaining and compromise.140 In the twenty-one states in which
panels draw district lines, only thirteen employ commissions with primary responsibility for drawing the plan, two states utilize advisory commissions, and five utilize
backup commissions.141
Yet none of these systems reaches the level of independence and autonomy the independent citizens commission does.142 This model solves the two great polemics of
independence and autonomy described above. First, because allowing legislators to
“choose their voters” creates conflict of interest concerns, the greater the separation between legislators who stand to be elected by these districts and the actual district line
drawing, the lesser the conflict.143 The citizens commission system reaches the ultimate
degree of separation as legislators’ sole involvement in the process is the right to strike
names from a pool of potential commission members.144 Second, when commissions
possess mere advisory or backup authority, their effect is only to encourage legislators
134

See Stephanopoulos, supra note 94, at 346–77. Stephanopoulos outlines the history of redistricting initiatives in several states, with Oklahoma standing out for its rather extreme swing.
“Prior to 1960, the Oklahoma state legislature was one of the most misapportioned in the country.” Id. at 347. The initiative, to enforce the state’s constitutional reapportionment formula by
commission, passed largely because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr, the state
supreme court’s “ultimatum to the state legislature,” and progressive state politicians. Id. at 352.
135
Cain, supra note 17, at 1813.
136
Id. at 1813–14.
137
Id. at 1815.
138
Id. (describing how the existence of a backup commission, which would place the line
drawing into a bipartisan process, may boost the majority party’s ability to keep its members
from insisting on their own individual demands).
139
Id. at 1816.
140
Id.
141
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Commissions: Legislative
Plans, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/redist/2009-redistricting-commissions-table
.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
142
Cain, supra note 17, at 1818.
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WINBURN, supra note 22, at 2.
144
Application and Selection Process, WEDRAWTHELINES.CA.GOV, http://wedrawthelines.ca
.gov/selection.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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to conduct the process efficiently as legislators retain the power to adopt or reject
these commissions’ lines.145 In other words, no matter the degree of commission independence, its role is passive barring failure of the legislature to complete its task.
Commissions vested with full authority, subject only to judicial review, may be viewed
as the most autonomous.
California’s new citizens commission possesses not only separation, but also full
enactment power. The legislature retains no authority to approve either commission
members or the results of its work.146 It is possible that these factors are what scare politicians and those with entrenched interests in the system. A commission operating in
too neutral a manner may disrupt much of what lobbyists and donors have worked to
build, especially if the outcome is a crop of fresh, independent representatives.
D. Redistricting in California
The history of redistricting in California is as varied as its landscape and population. Four of the past five redistrictings, including the most recent, have been subject
to litigation.147 In the 1970s and 1990s, independent judges drew district lines, while in
the 1960s, 1980s, and 2000s, the legislature did.148 The decade-long shadow of each district redrawing, coming immediately after and as a consequence of the U.S. Census,
provides case studies from which to draw conclusions. Indeed, the 1973, 1981, and
1991 redistricting experiences illuminate trends in the process as well as the roots of
reform that would culminate in the passage of Proposition 11 and 20.149
In the 1970s, the Democrats controlled the legislature but answered to a Republican
governor, Ronald Reagan.150 This led to a showdown in 1971 as the Governor refused
to enact a district map that gerrymandered benefits for the Democrats.151 As a result, a
panel of special masters, California State Supreme Court appointed judges, drew the
lines which were accepted in 1973 and in place for the 1974 election.152 In the 1980s,
however, the Democrat-controlled legislature, with the support of a Democratic governor, manipulated the process to add five seats for the Democrats while drawing several
oddly shaped districts.153 With striking parallels to the 2012 election, Republicans,
145

Cain, supra note 17, at 1814.
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(1).
147
Chavez, supra note 29, at 320. Chavez addresses the past four redistrictings. For analysis
of the most recent redistricting, see infra Part III.
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Grainger, supra note 68, at 546. See generally GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ,
ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION (2002).
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Cain, supra note 17, at 1822–23.
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Grainger, supra note 68, at 548–49.
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Id.
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Id. at 548.
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Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 320,
331 (1985).
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viewing the plan as extreme partisan gerrymandering, immediately challenged the map
with a three-pronged assault.154 First, they used the referendum system to put on the ballot three propositions to replace each of the three legislative maps (assembly, senate,
and congressional).155 Second, they sought to have the plans take effect immediately,
before the propositions were voted on, for the 1982 election rather than the legislature’s
plans.156 Third, they placed Proposition 14 on the 1982 ballot, a proposal to create a
citizens commission to draw district lines instead of the legislature.157 In the end, the
California Supreme Court rejected the Republicans’ redistricting plans and ordered the
legislature’s plans to be used for the 1982 election.158 Proposition 14 failed at the ballot
box, but the other three referenda were successful, overturning the Democrats’ maps
only after they were used for the 1982 election.159 Thereafter, the two parties hammered
out a deal that provided sufficient benefits to Republicans to ensure passage and avoid
defaulting to the special masters.160
The 1980s redistricting imbroglio left a legacy of bitterness between the parties and
illuminates the impetus for subsequent redistricting attempts.161 Lawsuits and calls for
reform marked the 1980s, culminating in 1991 with another impasse in the political process in which special masters once again took over.162 This time, the special masters’
plan secured gains for Democrats, which they were keen to lock in through bipartisanship during the next go-around in 2001.163
This makes sense politically: when a majority party is viewed as abusing its linedrawing power, the opposition will resort to available tactics to upset that hegemony.
In a state like California, where a minority party has recourse to referenda, initiative,
and the court’s special masters, the party in power will operate strategically to maximize and lock in gains. In a state without such procedures, a majority party would find
less incentive to work with the minority to draw mutually favorable districts. When the
parties work together, horse trading for districts and engaging in give-and-take electoral
exchanges, critics voice the concern that the cost of bipartisanship is competitive elections, centrist politicians, and moderate legislatures.164 Partisan districting increases a
party’s registration in districts that lean for that party.165
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The 2001 redistricting saw just such a result; lines were drawn in a bipartisan
manner, preserving both parties’ seats, and in the election that followed not one seat
changed party hands.166 In a sort of political “live and let live” compact, it seems the
parties were able to find common ground in the preservation of incumbent seats.167 This
deal would prove ironic as the law of unintended consequences took effect in the subsequent years. The 2002 election, in which long-time politicians Howard Berman, Brad
Sherman, Lois Capps, Elton Gallegly, and David Dreier168 all benefitted with safe seat
victories, stood as an “argument against the redistricting system in California” and a
poster child for partisan gerrymandering gone too far.169
III. PROPOSITION 11
As a consequence of these experiences, California reformers continued to view any
redistricting linked to the very political branches being elected with suspicion and distrust.170 This distrust led to efforts by various groups to change the redistricting process.
Proposition 14, which would have created a commission with members selected by
judges and the parties, failed in 1982, as did similarly styled Proposition 39 in 1984.171
In 1990, voters also struck down Proposition 118, which would have required redistricting plans to receive two-thirds of the vote in the legislature, the governor’s signature,
and voter approval, and Proposition 119, which would have created a bipartisan commission to draw maps.172 Finally, in 2005, Proposition 77, which would have created
a commission to conduct redistricting, also failed to receive voter approval.173
Proposition 11 would be different. This time, proponents would be more focused,
support more widespread, and endorsements more ringing.174 An initiative placed on
the ballot by voters, Proposition 11 would amend the California constitution by establishing a “Citizens Redistricting Commission . . . [to] draw new district lines . . .
for State Senate, Assembly, and Board of Equalization districts.”175 Then-Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned for the measure stating, “[w]e need a system of
truly competitive legislative districts so when lawmakers go home, they can be held
accountable.”176 The measure even proclaimed under its “Findings and Purpose”
166

Grainger, supra note 68, at 549.
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Text of Proposed Laws: Proposition 11, § 2(a) 137, available at http://wedrawthelines.ca
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section that “[a]llowing politicians to draw their own districts is a serious conflict of
interest that harms voters.”177 With strong popular support for the bill, well-funded
backing, and the governor campaigning for it, Proposition 11 had better chances than
any prior attempt to change redistricting in California.
In politics, promises are easy and facts are difficult. Supporters of Proposition 11
all but promised that more competitive elections would result from the passage of the
bill. Steve Westly, former State Controller, touted Proposition 11 as a common sense
measure that would create more competitive districts and “bring democracy back to
California again.”178 Westly cited “ideological extrem[ism]” as holding publicly funded
institutions, such as schools and hospitals, hostage during the recent budget fight in
Sacramento.179 A coalition of good-government groups such as California Forward,
California Taxpayers Association, and the League of Women Voters, sponsored the bill
and it was endorsed widely by politicians.180 The measure was even supported by former Governor Gray Davis whom Schwarzenegger replaced in a 2003 recall election.181
Governor Schwarzenegger sharpened his language as the vote drew near stating, “This
is a fixed system, . . . a system that rewards legislators for rigid partisanship . . . .”182
Proposition 11 differed in substantial ways from prior measures to reform the
district-line-drawing process. First, the proposition gave the task entirely to a citizens
commission, constrained only by the provision that the maps must conform with the
U.S. Constitution and the VRA.183 Second, the measure provided a minimal role for the
legislature.184 Third, there was no role for retired judges as in the prior measures.185
Finally, as initially proposed, Proposition 11 left in the hands of the legislature the task
of drawing congressional lines, giving the citizens commission the authority to draw
state Assembly, Senate, and Board of Equalization lines.186
A striking feature of the Proposition is its reference to three cities with “oddly
shaped districts to protect incumbent legislators.”187 The proposition avers that voters
177
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in these and other communities have “no political voice because they have been split
into as many as four different districts.”188 Even more striking are the proposition’s
promises, from making the redistricting process “open” and ensuring “full participation
of independent voters” to putting “voters back in charge.”189
A. Passage of Proposition 11
California voters agreed, and in 2008 took the job of district line drawing from the
state legislature and placed it in the hands of a citizens commission by a vote of 50.9%
in favor, 49.1% opposed.190 As initially passed, the proposition did not include U.S.
congressional districts. That provision was passed two years later in Proposition 20,
passed by a vote of 61.3% in favor, 38.7% opposed.191
Proposition 11 added Section 2 to Article XXI of the California Constitution and
declared: “[T]he Citizens Redistricting Commission . . . shall adjust the boundary
lines,” summarily removing the task from the legislature.192 Consisting of fourteen
members, the new commission was to be composed of five members registered with
each of the two largest parties and four not registered with either.193 Creation of such
a commission would immediately raise VRA concerns. Since the early 1970s, several
counties in California have qualified for coverage under Section 5 due to their Latino
populations.194 While the Latino population in the West has grown in recent years,
Latino electoral weight has not grown equivalently.195 Such underrepresentation is not
necessarily the result of gerrymandering and voter suppression as it is for other ethnic
and minority groups with different histories.196 However, statistics show the Latino
population in California grew from thirty-two percent in 2000 to thirty-eight percent
in 2010, but decreased in the California legislature from twenty-two percent in 2000
188
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_20111116_gdc_sec5sub.pdf. While the only states in the West fully covered by Section 5 of the
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to eighteen percent in 2011.197 In fact, the increase in Latino population accounts for
fully ninety percent of California’s overall population growth.198 The new commission
would have to draw new district lines in conformity with the VRA provisions, Supreme
Court decisions, and the principles enunciated in the California Constitution.199
Many districts with significant Latino populations were heavily Democratic in the
prior map, yet held by Anglo- or African-American incumbents.200 The commission’s
new map changed this dynamic in several places. Some incumbent Democrats faced
challenges from Latino Democrats in their primary.201 Add to this California’s new
“jungle primary” in which the top two vote getters in a primary face off in the general
election, regardless of party.202 This scheme offered the chance that a district could see
a Latino and an African-American or Anglo Democrat compete in the runoff election.203
Indeed, this was the result in several districts in 2012,204 yet how Proposition 11 will
impact Latino descriptive representation remains unclear and may not be evident
for years.205
B. Challenges to the Plan
Hardly had Secretary of State Debra Bowen certified the Commission’s work before challenges were filed with the State Supreme Court, per the statute’s provisions.206
One such challenge, Radanovich v. Bowen, alleged that race was used improperly as a
factor in creating voting districts.207 The plaintiffs alleged California’s 37th, 43rd, and
44th Congressional Districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the VRA, and requested the Court appoint special masters to redraw
the lines.208 On October 26, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition.209
197
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Plaintiffs then filed a complaint in U.S. District Court,210 to which the Citizens Commission timely filed a motion to dismiss.211 The court dismissed the case on res judicata
grounds finding: (1) the California Supreme Court had reached a final judgment on the
merits; (2) the issues in the prior dispute were the same as in the federal claim; and
(3) the same parties were involved in both actions.212 Therefore, under California law,
the prior rejection of the case was a final judgment.213
In another petition to the California Supreme Court, Julie Vandermost214 filed a
Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Form of Mandamus or Prohibition Emergency
Stay Requested in September 2011.215 The petition specifically challenged the certified
maps for the California Senate216 and requested that the court prohibit the Secretary of
State from enforcing them.217 Petitioner argued the maps were unconstitutional, unlawful, and unenforceable.218 Petitioner sought to stay the use of the maps and offered three
alternatives plans, one involving using a “nesting plan” or by reverting to the 2001 oddnumbered Senate districts.219
Meanwhile, a citizens group began to circulate petitions for a referendum staying
the implementation of the redistricting commission.220 In light of the fact that the petition had received over 700,000 signatures, Vandermost’s petition requested the Court
to clarify which district map for the State Senate would be used in the election in the
event the challenge successfully qualified for the ballot.221 Vandermost also filed three
possible alternate maps to be used in that event, rather than using the commission’s
certified maps.222
Concurrent with these events, the citizens commission submitted its certified maps
to the U.S. Attorney General for consideration under the VRA in November 2011.223
210
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The U.S. Department of Justice reviewed the maps and did not “interpose any objection
to the specified changes” the maps made.224 Upon these grounds, the citizens commission’s work could go forward without federal challenges to its legitimacy, notwithstanding the pending state court claims.
In January 2012, while the primary election was beginning to warm up, the
California Supreme Court ruled on Vandermost’s inquiry regarding the challenge to
the commission and which maps would be used.225 The court ruled that Vandermost’s
petition for writ of mandate was ripe, but found that there was no showing that the challenged referendum was likely to qualify for the ballot.226 The court agreed with the
Secretary of State’s argument that even if the commission’s map is eventually stayed
by the challenge, it should nonetheless be used during the primary election for the sake
of continuity and smoothness of elections.227 Specifically, in order to “avoid disruption
of the election planning process,” confusion, and the concomitant ills it would bring,
the commission’s map would be most appropriate.228 The court cited Assembly v.
Deukmejian229 for the proposition that the court must determine which map is “reasonably and practically available” and the “pros and cons of each.”230 It then evaluated
four maps available: the commission’s certified map and three maps submitted by
Vandermost.231 It is not surprising that the court concluded that the commission’s map
was the “most appropriate,” citing its conformity with the “constitutionally mandated
criteria embodied in the federal and state Constitutions.”232 The court went on to describe the process by which the commission had done its work, from the proposition
that put it on the ballot to the selection method used for its members.233
With the commission’s maps firmly in place for the 2012 election, what remained was to observe their impact on the matchups, discourse, fundraising, and ultimately whether they would diminish the partisanship of the legislative bodies they
would produce.
IV. THE 2012 ELECTION
The 2012 election was bound to be a shake-up to some degree. Pundits and analysts, not to mention political stakeholders, held their collective breath throughout the
Attorney Gen. (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting
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process, witnessing long-time incumbents retire, Democrat pitted against Democrat,
and voters reading ballots with two unfamiliar names under the major parties’ banner.
The 2012 election was variously referred to as a “perfect storm,”234 “slugfest,”235 and
even an “omen” for the Republican party and its future electoral losses.236 Through the
white noise of derision and praise for the commission’s work several key races and
outcomes emerged, which suggest conclusions about the consequences of California’s
electoral experiment.
This study analyzes three California districts comparing the new commission maps
with those that existed prior to Proposition 11. It will analyze the significant electoral
consequences of the commission’s work and assess whether competitiveness or the
other goals were realized. A necessary constraint in this analysis is that the process of
redistricting does not neatly arrange voters from former districts into new ones. For example, the 26th district largely became the 27th on the new map.237 Comparing the old
26th to the new 26th would be comparing entirely different constituencies, an analysis
with distinct merits and possibilities, yet not the focus of this study. This study aims to
compare outcomes where former and new districts largely overlap.
A. From Safe to Safe: The 27th District
California’s 26th District once covered from La Canada Flintridge all the way to
Rancho Cucamonga and north to San Gabriel and San Bernardino.238 The work of the
redistricting commission, however, changed the composition of the district, now numbered the 27th, adding eighteen percent more Asians and decreasing the white population to twenty-nine percent.239 Registered Democrats increased from thirty-five percent
to forty-two percent.240 David Dreier, an influential and long-serving Republican, now
faced a new constituency and the prospects of an uphill battle for reelection.241 Dreier
234
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decided not to run, citing Congress’s “low approval rating” and Americans’ desire for
“change in Congress.”242
Dreier’s decision could not have been a difficult calculation. After three decades
in Congress, Dreier had amassed considerable clout and influence, chairing the House
Rules Committee and establishing a solid conservative record.243 But these credentials
would do him no good in the new arrangements. His San Dimas home, in the prior 26th
District, was now placed in the 32nd District with its sixty-two percent Latino and
forty-seven percent registered Democrat to twenty-eight percent Republican.244 Dreier’s
other option was to run in the new 27th, a less unlikely prospect with forty-two percent
Democrat and thirty percent Republican.245 If he did, Dreier would face an uphill battle
necessitating huge influxes of cash to compete in a Democratic district against Judy
Chu, a popular Democrat whose former 32nd District had been incorporated into the
new 27th District.246 If the commission’s goal was to convert safe districts into competitive ones, it utterly failed in the 26th/27th by instead creating a safe Democratic district.
Dreier opted for retirement and Ms. Chu won with an astounding sixty-four percent of
the vote against newcomer Jack Orswell.247
In this District, the promise of a newly competitive race with fresh candidates and
new ideas did not result. While one long-time representative’s choice of retirement
over a bitter fight may be exactly what some proponents envisioned, a well-connected
politician winning with a supermajority clearly was not. It seems instead the work
of the commission created an environment where well-respected and popular representatives simply could not win, but the new district that forced his retirement was
still noncompetitive.
B. Berman v. Sherman: The Slugfest
As previously discussed, competitiveness is supposed to force candidates to broaden their appeal, move closer to the center politically, and attenuate their positions.248
242
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After the maps were redrawn for the 2012 election, California’s new 30th District incorporated territory once divided between Democrat Howard Berman’s 28th District,
Democrat Brad Sherman’s 27th District, and the prior 30th District.249 Both candidates
had won reelection with greater than sixty percent in their largely Democratic respective
districts for more than a decade.250 However, combined with California’s Proposition
14 allowing the top two vote getters to compete in a runoff election regardless of party
affiliation, the new 30th District was headed for a bruising battle between two wellfunded and entrenched Democrats.251
Redistricting favored Brad Sherman. The new 30th District was made up of sixty
percent of the voters from his prior district compared with twenty percent from Howard
Berman’s.252 Politically, the new 30th District was a shoo-in for any Democrat: fortynine percent of registered voters were Democrats compared with twenty-five percent
Republican.253 Indeed, the primary election resulted in both Democrats winning,
Berman garnering thirty-two percent of the vote to Sherman’s forty-two percent.254
Voters would have their choice between two Democratic Jewish lawyers with rhyming
last names, both educated at the University of California, Los Angeles, and with largely
the same political views.255 The differences between their positions came down to minor
nuances and the merits of their background experiences rather than deep divides over
policy.256 For example, while both supported it, Berman was seen as a “more enthusiastic supporter of free trade.”257 Both supported immigration reform, but Berman had
a longer history of advocating for farm workers.258
Depending on your political views, this scenario either represents the most competitive election imaginable or the most disenfranchising. Two candidates very close in
political opinion may have been what reformers had in mind, but not necessarily two
candidates both on the political left. On the other hand, while Democrats might be glad
249

See Jennifer Steinhauer, Lines Redrawn, Longtime Allies Fight for a Seat, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/us/politics/lines-redrawn-longtime-allies
-fight-for-a-seat.html.
250
Candidate Details: Brad Sherman, OURCAMPAIGNS.COM, http://www.ourcampaigns.com
/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=746 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); Candidate Details:
Howard L. Berman, OURCAMPAIGNS.COM, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html
?CandidateID=754 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
251
Steinhauer, supra note 245 (quoting Eric Bauman, chairman of the Los Angeles County
Democratic Party, as saying, “This is going to be the battle royal . . . . Both of these guys will be
extremely well funded with top-flight campaign teams.”).
252
Molly Ball, Clone Wars, THE ATLANTIC (May 21, 2012, 2:18 PM) http://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2012/06/clone-wars/308983/.
253
See Demographic Spreadsheet, supra note 234.
254
Morris, supra note 231.
255
See Ball, supra note 248 (listing similarities between the two candidates).
256
See generally Op-Ed., Howard Berman in the 30th, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, at A25.
257
Id.
258
Id.

2013]

ELECTION EVIDENCE

239

to be assured one of these two Democrats would be elected, they would also be assured
that both could not simultaneously be elected to the House of Representatives. One
would have to go home.
The consequence of the independent citizens commission’s work, then, would be
to force two well-respected Democrats with proven track records in their districts to
spend millions of dollars lambasting each other in search of the narrowest political high
ground.259 Herein lies one key shortcoming in the independent citizens commission, especially the California iteration. Legally mandated majority-minority districts, along
with California demographics, will usually be strongly Democratic because these populations are usually predominantly Democratic.260 As a result, these districts will usually
be highly noncompetitive. Further, placing so many Democrats into a district may even
necessitate the drawing of safe Republican districts.261 To proponents of progressive
reforms, this poses a moral dilemma: preserve minority voting strength while sacrificing
electoral competitiveness.262 Compactness might also be jeopardized in search of competitive districts by stretching districts between areas dominated by different parties.263
Competitive districts of the sort envisaged by proponents of Proposition 11 may not
only be difficult given these conflicting objectives and legal and demographic constraints, they may not even be desirable. Group sorting264 and cultural polarization265
are facts of American existence. Depending on which prestigious publication one consults, partisan politics either causes polarization among Americans or is the result of
it.266 In either case, Americans are becoming more deeply divided politically. Redistricting may offer very little to ameliorate this trend.
Further, ignoring the reality of a divided America may be problematic in other
ways. As previously discussed, competitive elections tend to draw greater fundraising
259
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by interest groups and raise tensions in the debate.267 On the other hand, safe districts
create little political noise as candidates are almost certain of victory.268 It may be that
with the former, more Americans on the farther political edges will be unrepresented
as more moderate candidates succeed in more evenly divided districts. Finally, with
safe districts, the acrimony and tension that would otherwise play out during the election are instead released in the legislature, with the citizens observers to the drama
rather than players in it.
C. The Ribbon of Shame
The California 23rd is another district that experienced dramatic changes as a
direct result of the commission’s work. Known as the “ribbon of shame,” the former
California 23rd District once snaked along the California coast for hundreds of miles
between bucolic Cambria and busy Oxnard.269 Literally no thicker than a few blocks in
some portions, the district has long been the object of scorn for its gerrymandered
shape, but its representative, Lois Capps, has benefited from this linking of distant bastions of Democrats.270 She has easily won reelection in each election since the District
was drawn after the 2000 census.271 However, much has changed since the commission
conducted its work.272 The new District covering most of this territory—the 24th—will
retain a Democratic majority, but by a much narrower margin. This district is composed
of 39.2% registered Democrats and 35.4% registered Republicans.273
In the 2012 election, Ms. Capps faced Republican Abel Maldonado in the 24th
District.274 This District was one of the few Republicans hoped to wrest from Democrats as the demographics tended to infer a chance at a competitive election.275 But Ms.
Capps’s popularity, decades of service, and name recognition gave her the edge.276
267
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What became clear is that longtime representative Elton Gallegly found himself redistricted not into a district of overwhelming Democrats, but one of Republicans, with
another popular and powerful Republican congressman, Buck McKeon.277 Under the
new configuration, most of the 23rd District territory was incorporated into a new 24th
District, and the new 23rd District moved far inland taking bits from several other districts.278 These changes dramatically altered voting populations. The new 24th District
became narrowly Democratic, but assumed a more balanced composition of voters than
previous.279 The iconic Morro Rock and surrounding sleepy bed-and-breakfasts became
part of the same district as larger inland cities like Santa Maria and small rural towns
like Santa Ynez.280 In order to win a closely divided district such as this, a candidate
would presumably have to attenuate her views to gain voters at the margins.
For Elton Gallegly, the decision was probably not too difficult. He decided not to
seek reelection due to the redistricting.281 Gallegly may have foreseen the type of intraparty fight exemplified by the Berman v. Sherman contest and chose retirement instead.
Perhaps he saw the difficulty of running a race in a more moderate district as a candidate with a strongly conservative record. In any event, citizens in the much more narrowly divided district, forty-one percent Democratic and thirty-six percent Republican,
are now represented by a long-time Democrat with as liberal a record as Gallegly’s was
conservative.282 Whether this was the vision of the proponents of Proposition 11 is difficult to tell. More difficult to tell is what future elections will hold and to what extent
any new competitive districts will simply revert back to safe ones.
CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that the Berman v. Sherman conflagration and other examples demonstrate why competitiveness generally is a fool’s gold of electoral reform.
The fight for the 30th District was arguably one of the ugliest and costliest in recent
California history, nearly coming to blows during a debate.283 Howard Berman’s defeat after nearly $15 million spent by the candidates and outside groups ultimately does
not benefit voters of either party.284 The retirement of key representatives like Elton
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Gallegly also may not improve representation measurably or increase voter satisfaction
in candidate selection. Finally, and most important to this inquiry, the citizens commission in California did not create the hoped-for competitive elections, and therefore has
little chance at measurably reducing polarization in Sacramento or Congress. Instead,
the changes it wrought simply paved the way for other well-connected politicians to
win safely in those districts and create a new generation of safe districts.
The greatest advantage to the implementation of the citizens commission has likely
been the appearance of transparency and the diminished sense of an inherent conflict
of interest in Sacramento.285 Californians clearly felt the impulse to remove from legislators the power over district line drawing and probably voted in favor of it, cognizant
of the state’s history with partisan gerrymanders. Beyond the senses and impressions
that the system is now more transparent, little seems to have been gained from handing
the task of redistricting to a citizens commission in California. Given the present
evidence, there is simply insufficient evidence to draw causal links from the establishment of a citizens commission to increased competitiveness and ultimately to
less polarization.286
Finally, for good or for bad, politicians in Sacramento have one less arrow in their
quiver when it comes to political bargaining. This may be one of the bigger losses, as
leaving redistricting in the hands of those most experienced in performing grand bargains has distinct policy benefits of its own.287 While conclusive statements about the
citizens commission are premature after only one election, it is safe to suggest that studies should continue to assess California elections with a critical eye on the causal link
between the citizens commission’s work and legislative polarization. One such study
should evaluate future elections in light of what may have resulted from a redistricting
process that retained the citizens commission, but returned the redistricting to the
legislature and required the two bodies to work collaboratively.
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